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EPISTEME XXXIII

A Life Well Lived is a Life Completed:
A Heideggerian Account of a Good Life
Rosalie Looijaard
University of Toronto
I. Introduction
Heidegger determines the average everydayness of his concept
of Dasein as follows: “entangled-disclosed, thrown-projecting
being in the world, which is concerned with its ownmost
potentiality in its being together with the “world” and beingwith with others” (175). In simpler terms, this means that as
human beings, we are primarily concerned with living up to
our own potentiality given the possibilities accessible to us, and
we seek to do so in solidarity with the world and the people
around us. Heidegger thus describes the necessity for us to
reach our true potentiality to live a good life, but does not give
us a clear account of how to achieve this.
In this paper I will deduce a practical account of a life well
lived in which we achieve our ownmost potentiality from
Heidegger’s ontology. I argue that under a Heideggerian
ontological view, a life well lived is a life completed, in which
there is authentic being-towards-death marked by peace with
the prospect of death. Authentic being-towards-death can be
achieved through the sufficient fulfillment of one’s ownmost
aspirations. These aspirations can be fulfilled by taking an
active and resolute stance within one’s existential possibilities,
thus giving us an account of a practical and attainable theory of
a life well lived.
First, I will define and interpret some crucial Heideggerian
terms I will be using throughout the paper. Then, I will lay
out the relevant parts of Heidegger’s ontology, which will
form the foundation for my argument. In particular, I will
begin by explaining where Dasein initially finds itself in
the world, and how it relates to itself and others. I will then
explain how this state of Dasein shows us what Dasein needs
to act on to live well. Then, I will outline Dasein’s relationship
with death and anxiety, and how peace with the prospect
of death is necessary for completion. Then, I will elaborate
9
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on what I mean by fulfilling aspirations, as well as how it
relates to authenticity. Heidegger’s notion of authenticity
will be central to my argument, precisely because Heidegger
intended for authenticity to be value-neutral, and previous
notions of a “good life” have often been entangled in moral
judgements, such as Aristotle’s concept of human flourishing as
Eudaimonia, which requires being a virtuous person. Instead,
authenticity and completion are value-neutral. Next, I will give
my account of completion and how it can be attained. Lastly,
I will briefly consider plausible objections to my argument as
well as some practical implications of my argument for the field
of ethics.
II. Defining Terms
Heidegger’s philosophy relies inherently on his use of the
German language, and as such English interpretations of
his word choices vary. I will thus explain why I opt to use
the original German for some of his terms in lieu of English
translations, and the particular interpretations of these terms I
will adhere to. Before I briefly do this, I will give the relevant
interpretation of Dasein; a core concept of this paper and
Heidegger’s work and one that has been left almost universally
untranslated to maintain its meaning.
There exists significant debate as to how the entity that Dasein
designates should be understood, but for my argument the
most important component of Dasein is the description it gives
us of human persons and their activity in the world. Thus, I
will use Haugeland’s interpretation of Dasein (as reiterated
by Rouse) as my working definition: Dasein is a way of living
that embodies an understanding of being (Wrathall 206). The
components that are most relevant to my argument are as
follows: Dasein’s essence lies in its existence, meaning that its
own existence is of crucial concern to it; it is inherent to Dasein
to always be concerned with its own being (Heidegger 41, 185).
Furthermore, Dasein always defines and understands itself in
terms of the possibilities that it is (Heidegger, 44).
As stated, I will utilize some of Heidegger’s original German
terms in cases where there exist significant differences between
scholars on what terms to use. Most notably are Befindlichkeit
and das Man. Befindlichkeit, typically translated as state of
mind, affectedness, or disposedness, is the term Heidegger
10
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uses to describe where Dasein finds itself in the world. It is
closely related to the concept of being-in-the-world, which
denotes Dasein’s existence as inherently and inseparably being
part of the world and its environment. Befindlichkeit will be
explored more in-depth in section VI, and since there is a lack
of scholarly consensus regarding its most accurate translation, I
will opt to use the original German throughout this paper.
Das Man has been translated as “the They,” “the anyone” and
“the One.” Dreyfus gives a compelling argument for using “the
One,” as Heidegger’s original concept was not meant to only
denote “the other,” but rather social norms: “one pays one’s
taxes (Dreyfus 158). On the other hand, “the They” is often used
to emphasize the external societal pressures and norms that are
being put on Dasein and Dasein’s potential to become lost in
“the They.” Both translations are criticized for failing to capture
the full meaning of das Man, which Heidegger intended to
denote an abstract conceptualization of humanity’s social
reality that Dasein itself is also part of. Throughout this paper,
I will thus opt to use the original German das Man. There will
be a handful of other Heideggerian terms throughout the paper,
but their definitions are less complex and will thus be defined
when relevant.
III. Being-in-the-World: Befindlichkeit and das Man
I will now give the relevant aspects of Heidegger’s being-in-theworld and its relationship with das Man to illustrate the initial
state of Dasein from which it must act out its life. According
to Heidegger, the most basic level of the world in which we
carry out our lives is fundamentally a meaning-filled context,
and everything in it exists in reciprocal interdependence to
us (Guignon & Pereboom 192-195). Each individual person’s
life is made their own by where they find themselves, their
Befindlichkeit. We are thrown into a pre-existing environment
that is filled with possibilities. In Befindlichkeit, Dasein finds
itself confronted with its current, future, and past possibilities;
it reveals what situation we were thrown into (Heidegger 238). I
argue that we as human beings receive our sufficient conditions
for completion from this nexus of possibilities. This nexus of
possibilities is anxiety inducing. Dreyfus explains this sort of
anxiety in Befindlichkeit as the idea that “social action now
appears as a game which there is no point in playing since it
has no intrinsic meaning” (180). The “meaning of life” might
11
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almost seem like an illusionary conspiracy made up by society
if Dasein loses itself in das Man. In order to feel complete,
Dasein needs to authentically project itself towards some
sort of social action or role that Dasein cares about and thus
experiences as meaningful. If Dasein’s social actions and roles
seem meaningless and pointless, Dasein will not feel complete.
Dasein’s anxiety can thus be dissipated by searching within the
existential - practically attainable - possibilities to find those
towards which Dasein is authentically projected.
With this basic ontology of Dasein’s initial existence, we can
begin to examine what Dasein needs to find fulfillment before
we identify a path to achieve said fulfillment. I am using
“fulfillment” here as a measure for completion, as the average
person will often describe having lived a life well lived as
having lived a fulfilling life. As stated earlier, one of the core
characteristics of Dasein is that it cares about its own being.
Dasein is also characterized by the need to do and undertake
practical actions. I thus deduce that Dasein needs to engage
in activity projected towards something it cares about to feel
fulfilled. I will henceforth refer to what Dasein cares about and
seeks to engage in projected activity towards as aspirations, for
the sake of brevity.
To understand how Dasein can find its aspirations among
the existential possibilities, we first need to take a look at
Heidegger’s concept of the self. Heidegger’s definition of the
self (or selfhood) is different from many traditional conceptions
of the self (e.g. as psychological identity). Wrathall states that
for Heidegger, the self is a disclosive function that an individual
acts out (66). This particular individual has “specific projects,
dispositions, skills, and practices” that determine how the
world shows up for them and how they act in response: we
are thus continuously influenced by das Man, and rarely our
ownmost self (Wrathall 66). For most people, it will thus be
difficult to find one’s self within society. Dasein’s self as a
particular is often dispersed, and sometimes lost, in das Man
(Heidegger 258). Dasein typically primarily understands itself
in terms of norms that were decided by das Man (Wrathall 643).
Das Man maintains itself in its everydayness by remaining in
the ontic, factical realm, and only concerns itself with beings as
objects, rather than ways of beings, staying within preconceived
boundaries of social norms. Regardless, it is impossible to exist
completely separate from das Man due to the nature of Dasein
12

EPISTEME XXXIII

as being-in-the-world. It is thus crucial that Dasein finds itself
within das Man. Dasein will derive a significant amount of its
roles and interpretations of what it means to be human from
das Man (Dreyfus 158), but to truly feel complete, I argue that
Dasein must find among these roles the role that is grounded
in authenticity and the self, rather than only in das Man. This
requires that Dasein is shown to itself in its possible authenticity
while it is lost in das Man (Heidegger 258). As stated earlier,
the self is a disclosive function, and if the self is a disclosive
function, then it is pivotal in disclosing aspirations among the
existential possibilities.
IV. Being-towards-Death and Anxiety
If this disclosure lies in the self, but the self is also inseparably
tied up in das Man, then we must show the self can nonetheless
disclose its ownmost aspirations. The key to this lies in anxiety.
As stated in the previous section, anxiety arises when we are
confronted by the vast amount of possibilities. In Heidegger’s
analysis of anxiety, we learn that anxiety reminds us that our
time is limited for our lives are finite, and we are ultimately
responsible for our actions and thus in control of our own
potentiality-for-being. Anxiety makes us aware that we have
this responsibility to shape our own life before we are faced
with death. Anxiety confronts Dasein with its freedom for
authenticity of its being as a possibility. In doing so, anxiety
shows Dasein its conditions for authenticity: it makes one aware
of how one is (Heidegger 182). The conditions of authenticity
will be explored further in a later section.
We must thus first carefully lay out the role of death before we
can get into the functional use of anxiety. Heidegger states that
“death signifies a peculiar possibility-of-Being in which the
very Being of one’s own Dasein is an issue. In dying, it is shown
that mineness and existence are ontologically constitutive for
death” (Heidegger 247). In other words, Death is the moment in
which our existence becomes finalized, and in this finalization,
our own being and our own life becomes an issue for ourselves.
We are always aware of the impending nature of death. We
are always being-toward-death, and this reveals to us our
own potentiality-for-being. In death, Dasein is manifested as
everything it ever was, is, and ever will be. Heidegger gives us
a succinct definition of the ontological concept of death to keep
in mind as we wrestle with its role: “as the end of Dasein, death
13
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is the ownmost, non relational, certain, and, as such indefinite
and insuperable possibility of Dasein” (248). Death is inevitable
and yet unique to every individual. It sums up Dasein’s life in
its totality, and as such death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility.
It is important to note that by death, Heidegger does not
simply mean physical and biological death. Thomson points
out Heidegger’s distinction between “demise” and “death”
by explaining that demise is the ordinary physical death and
complete annihilation of experience that we typically think of,
and that death is the existential phenomenon that implicitly
shapes our experiences with demise (Wrathall 218). It is death
as this existential phenomenon that gives us this anxiety, for
it marks our eventual inability to change anything about our
existence.
The mindset of a person who has not had a life well lived but
faces death is laid out by the character Inez in Jean-Paul Sartre’s
play No Exit: “One always dies too soon- or too late. And yet
one’s whole life is complete at that moment, with a line drawn
neatly under it, ready for the summing up. You are- your life,
and nothing else” (Sartre 24) Whether peace with the prospect
of death is present or not, one recognizes that life is complete
when death occurs, in the sense that it has ended and nothing
can be added to it. It is completed in the sense that it has been
finalized: concluded and exhausted. However, completion as I
use the term throughout this paper entails a certain satisfaction
and peace. Completion is something that can be achieved before
death, that entails that there is nothing left one aspires to be or
have.
To further understand this, and to play into Heidegger’s
emphasis on everydayness, we can examine an analogy. There
is a more everyday manifestation of anxiety similar to that
which we have towards death. Take the dynamic between
wake and sleep. At the end of a day well lived, it is often easy
to go to sleep. At the end of a day not well lived, the prospect
of ending the day by sleeping is often filled with anxiety. You
might consider the day wasted, and feel anxious that you
did not do or be everything you aspired to do or be with the
time allotted to you in the day. This is akin to the anxiety we
feel in being-towards-death. The key difference between this
everyday manifestation of anxiety and its total manifestation
is final, barring concepts of reincarnation, there is no more
14
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time that comes afterwards that matters for the totality of one’s
life. The anxiety surrounding death is thus much greater than
that surrounding sleep, but they are of a similar kind. Anxiety
also entails feelings of unsettledness that mark that there is
something missing or disturbed, detaching Dasein from its
own being-in-the-world, which is integral to its very being.
The perseverance of this anxiety until the point of death is an
obstacle to Dasein’s ability to live a life completed. However,
anxiety is first necessary to identify what matters most to
Dasein. Anxiety causes a breakdown that reveals to Dasein its
own nature and that of the world around it. It thus reveals that
Dasein has no control over what already is, thereby revealing
that Dasein is dependent on a pre-existing public environment
that it had no hand in producing (Dreyfus 177). Nonetheless,
it must find in this pre-existing environment those existential
possibilities that it can make its own. By accepting anxiety,
Dasein can respond to the situation it finds itself in.
I argue that by accepting and responding to this anxiety in
being-towards-death that Heidegger describes, Dasein will be
able to project itself to what matters to it; its aspirations. When
Dasein does this, anxiety will diminish and completion in the
absence of unfilled aspirations and thus peace with the prospect
of death can be achieved. This is also what differentiates
peace with the prospect of death from a death wish or suicidal
idealization. When life feels complete, we are filled with a sense
of peace and tranquility. When we wish to die or have suicidal
ideations, we are instead filled with anxiety, hopelessness, or
emptiness. The anxiety that has been present throughout life is
still there in suicidal idealization, but diminishes in peace with
the prospect of death. To find this peace then, we must examine
what fulfills Dasein. Inherent to Dasein is that it cares about its
own being and will project itself towards what matters to it.
Without something that matters to it and that it can act towards,
Dasein is reduced to a passive, antithetical version of itself.
V. Authenticity and Aspirations
In section II I noted that Dasein seeks to undertake projected
activity towards that which it cares about: that what Dasein
cares about through projected activity I refer to as aspirations.
I also briefly noted in section IV that anxiety reveals to us
our aspirations, and I will now give a more complete account
of what constitutes our authentic aspirations and how we
15
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go about acting to fulfill them. As human beings, we throw
ourselves into social roles that reflect what matters to us: “In
throwing myself into the life of a scholar or a brewer, I respond
to what matters, what is significant or important, in this way of
life. Dasein’s being matters to it, and so it is called by its being
to its being” (Wrathall 206, 138). Our aspirations are thus often
tied to social roles and projects we seek to fulfill because we
care about them in our being. It is important to differentiate
these aspirations from social roles or projects we seek to fulfill
for some external reward: such as social expectations rooted
in das Man, or financial prospect. Through this differentiation,
we can also identify what our ownmost authentic aspirations
are. Our authentic aspirations are those that do not come solely
from das Man.
Before I give an account of authentic aspirations, I will briefly
interpret Heidegger’s notion of authenticity itself more closely.
It is important to note that Heidegger avoided making explicit
value judgments and intended for his notion of authenticity
to be largely amoral. As such, it is difficult to reconcile
authenticity as being essential to a good life, a concept often
inherently associated with happiness, virtuosity, and other
value judgments. However, I aim to avoid this problem by
supposing authenticity as a prerequisite for completion, a
value-neutral concept. It is then merely the case that a life well
lived constitutes a life completed, in the sense of contentedness,
rather than moral-adjacent judgments such as a good or bad
life.
Authenticity is best explained in contrast to inauthenticity. To
be authentic, Dasein must avoid facticity. Facticity is the aspect
of inauthentic Dasein which suggests that what Dasein already
is, is an established fact. For example, if one is employed in a
certain career, then that is an established fact for them, marking
a sort of unalterable state. Dasein is thus inauthentic when it
is completely swallowed up and determined by das Man. To
become authentic entails taking responsibility for one’s own
existence and not falling into das Man. This requires adjusting
one’s comportment in correspondence to authenticity. This does
not necessarily mean changing careers (although it can), but
can mean changing how one comports oneself towards one’s
career. Authenticity entails seizing the roles one has in society
and making them one’s own in the Heideggerian sense of
Eigentlichkeit - owning oneself.
16
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Authentic aspirations then are the existential possibilities
that Dasein, through anxiety, identifies as being its ownmost.
Dasein needs to take a resolute stance towards its existential
possibilities and project itself into its ability-to-be. Calling
upon Heidegger’s emphasis on doing, aspirations are then
fulfilled by engaging in activity. To illustrate my account of
authentic aspirations, take the example of a person who aspires
to become a painter. They want to paint for painting’s sake.
They do not want to paint simply because society tells them
painting is valuable, or will make them rich (these can be
secondary motivations, but should not be the primary reasons
for the aspiration). The painter encountered art in the vast
array of existential possibilities and identified this, through
anxiety as noted in section IV, as one of their ownmost authentic
aspirations. This aspiration is then fulfilled by doing and
taking responsibility for their actions. They need to actively
and physically handle the paint and the brush. They can only
fulfill their aspiration to be a painter by picking up the tools
and engaging in the actions of a painter. By seizing upon
this particular possibility that they have found and engaged
within their Befindlichkeit, they can achieve fulfillment and
move towards completion. Completion is thus marked by
a fulfillment of aspirations and peace with the prospect of
death. However, fulfilling all of one’s aspirations can be near
impossible. For completion, one only needs to fulfill a sufficient
amount of existentially possible aspirations, meaning that they
fulfill those aspirations most important and most accessible to
them. Other aspirations must be distanced from. If you aspire
to become a painter, but you are severely allergic to all forms
of paint, you must distance yourself from this aspiration and
identify an existentially possible aspiration to fulfill instead this may be a different form of artistry, or a different kind of
aspiration altogether.
It is also not the case that one must only work towards their
authentic aspirations. Oftentimes, engaging in other aspirations
and obligations is necessary to function within society. What
matters is that alongside these extrinsic actions, one acts
towards the fulfillment of their own aspirations. Otherwise,
Dasein will simply become stuck in das Man. This is reflected
in how we often characterize working a dead-end job simply
to survive as an unfulfilling existence. The need to make
money and stay afloat in society is rarely part of our authentic
aspirations. Regardless, this is necessary for us to survive in the
17
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current state of our society, but it does not ultimately determine
completion and will thus not ensure we feel we have lived our
lives well. By focusing too much on the necessary means we
need to survive, we fall deeper into das Man and cloud our
perception of our own aspirations. The painter might never
be able to fully fulfill his aspiration to paint if he becomes
stuck in the notion that he needs to make money to survive
and focuses solely on this by, for example, taking an office job.
However, the painter might feel a lot more comfortable in this
office job making enough money to survive even if it means
not fulfilling their own aspirations. As Heidegger points out,
das Man is comforting, and functioning in it and with it is
necessary for our survival, but remaining solely in das Man will
not diminish our anxiety towards death. The painter will still
feel a much more unsettling existential anxiety in the office job,
preventing him from finding peace with the prospect of death.
Thus, our need to survive in das Man and our need to fulfill our
own aspirations need to be balanced. However, our anxieties
towards the former will seem almost frivolous in the face of
death, and thus ultimately will not matter nearly as much for
our ability to feel peace with the prospect of death.
In order to attain a life completed, one thus needs to (a)
disclose, take responsibility for, and act towards one’s ownmost
authentic aspirations, and (b) distance oneself and let go of
all other and not existentially possible aspirations. When this
is done, a lack of unfulfilled aspirations is what evokes the
feeling of peace with the prospect of death and marks a life well
lived. It will not seem like death has come too soon, or too late.
Instead, the person who experienced a life well lived is in a
sense ready to face death.
VI. Completion
I have unpacked the relevant parts of Heidegger’s ontology and
its implications, and have given my account of aspirations. I
will now give a brief overview of my account of the necessary
conditions for completion and my account completion
itself. What constitutes completion will be different for each
individual, as each person’s life is made their own through
the terms of their Befindlichkeit as outlined in section III.
However, we can nonetheless outline a generalized path
towards completion. The necessary condition for completion
is that Dasein feels peace with the prospect of death. This is
18
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achieved by the sufficient fulfillment of aspirations. Dasein
finds itself as being-in-the-world, on the edge of falling into
Das Man (or alternatively, already having become lost in Das
Man). Regardless of its initial position, Dasein will find itself
surrounded by possibilities and will experience existential
anxiety. It must project itself towards the existential possibilities,
and Dasein’s anxiety will reveal to it what it cares most about.
In revealing that which Dasein cares most about, its ownmost
aspirations will be disclosed as well, as these aspirations will be
rooted in that which Dasein cares about. Once these aspirations
are disclosed, Dasein can take a resolute stance towards them.
This resolution entails making authentic choices that seek to
fulfill Dasein’s aspirations. In fulfilling its ownmost aspirations,
Dasein will achieve a sense of completion, and anxiety will
dissipate. This completion of aspirations and absence of anxiety
will lead to a feeling of peace with the prospect of death. Once
Dasein is content and at peace with its own manifestation of
totality as death, Dasein is authentically being-towards-death.
Under Heidegger’s ontology, a practical characterization of a
life well lived can thus be summed up as a life completed, in
which death simply marks the totality of an ownmost authentic
existence, made up of the fulfillment of aspirations through
resolutely making sufficient authentic choices. When Dasein
feels a serene peace with the prospect of death, this is thus a
consequence that its ownmost aspirations have been fulfilled,
and its existence has reached totality - completion.
VII. Objections and Responses
One might object that a value-neutral conception of a life
well lived is inherently flawed, as within a society living
well also entails ethical conduct towards others and thus
being an ethically “good” person. This is also implied by
Heidegger’s statement that Dasein’s ownmost potentiality is
also determined in its being-with with others (175). To this I
respond that my account does not rule out that one should also
strive to be a moral person in regards to other’s potentialityfor-being. As such, the conditions I outline for a life completed
are necessary, rather than sufficient. Someone may fulfill all
of their aspirations for their own potentiality-for-being, but
still feel anxiety towards death, due to moral faults they made
throughout their life. In fact, Heidegger’s ontology similarly
implies that we have certain ethical obligations in respecting
other’s potentiality-for-being, but outlining these is outside of
19
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the scope of this paper.
Another plausible objection is that aspirations may be volatile,
or someone may have bad aspirations. To the latter, a similar
response can once again be given that Heidegger’s ontology
implies that we should respect others’ potentiality-for-being. To
the former, aspirations are to an extent contingent, in that they
depend on the environment in which one finds themselves.
Dasein’s aspirations will always be dependent on the available
existential possibilities and the way that Dasein is socialized. I
also account for the fact that someone can lose the notion that
their life is complete by uncovering a new possibility, and thus
the prospect of life ending too late rears its head, and anxiety
returns. Regardless, by virtue of being ownmost to Dasein,
authentic aspirations will not be volatile to the point that they
change so often that they inhibit Dasein from finding sufficient
fulfillment. Dasein need not fulfill every single aspiration it ever
had and ever will have, but simply enough to attain peace with
the prospect of death, and thus a sense of completion.

20
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Illusionism on the Brink of
Disillusionment
Ariel LaFayette
University of Toronto
Abstract
Distilling a theory of “qualia”—with at least some degree
of consensus—has been a grand point of contention in the
philosophy of mind since the term qualia were introduced.
In this paper, I will focus on one area where qualia realists
and anti-realists come to head-to-head; how does philosophy
sufficiently account for qualia’s constitutive property of
“intrinsic subjectivity”? First, I will summarize David
Chalmers’ meta-problem to contextualize this aspect of the
qualia debate. Second, I explain how Keith Frankish’s theory
of “illusionism” is a tenable solution to resolving the metaproblem from an anti-qualia realist perspective. Yet, when it
comes to addressing qualia’s constitutive feature of intrinsic
subjectivity, illusionism faces an insurmountable obstacle due
to its methodological commitment to third-person empiricism.
I argue the preceding point by analyzing how illusionism
confronts two challenges: (1) Philip Goff’s real-acquaintance
hypothesis, accompanied with Goff’s theory of panpsychism;
(2) a modern adaptation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s “private
language” thought experiment. My purpose is to argue that
Frankish’s theory of illusionism is ill-equipped for dealing with
these philosophical challenges.
Introduction
The term “qualia” is referenced in a wide range of philosophical
arguments which maintain the elements of conscious experience
that cannot be reduced to neuroscientific explanation. The
classic definition of qualia refers to the intrinsic, subjective, and
ineffable components of conscious experience (Frankish 2012,
2-3). The subjective component is “what-it’s-like” to undergo
a conscious experience, emphasizing the subject’s direct access
to their own conscious experience. Qualia realists claim that
even if we provided the most sophisticated neuroscientific
explanation of our conscious experiences, this would fail to
encapsulate qualia (Nagel 1974, 435). Therefore, qualia are
irreducible as such.
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The philosopher Keith Frankish defends the potential for thirdperson empiricism, such as developments in neuroscience, to
“explain away” the ontological reality of qualia. In response
to the qualia realist’s convictions, Frankish claims they are
cast under a cognitive “illusion” that qualia properties exist.
For example, he argues that the claim qualia are accessed via
“introspection” will eventually be explained as a cognitive
illusion (Frankish 2016, 12-13). In this sense, Frankish respects
that qualia realists claim that it “feels like” there are qualia
properties, but he denies their ontological existence.
The aim of my paper is to show how Frankish’s proposed
method for explaining away qualia through neuroscience hits
a dead-end when attempting to dismantle qualia’s constitutive
property of intrinsic subjectivity. The crux of my argument
is that Frankish’s commitment to third-person empiricism
ultimately prevents him from directly addressing the definition
of intrinsic subjectivity. My paper will show how this problem
emerges in two different contexts. First, I will show how
Frankish’s theory of illusionism faces against Philip Goff’s
“real acquaintance hypothesis” and panpsychism, wherein the
property of intrinsic subjectivity plays a central role. Second,
to further drive the point that qualia’s property of intrinsic
subjectivity is irreconcilable for illusionism, I will be reimagining Wittgenstein’s famous “private language” thought
experiment from a modern perspective. Lastly, I will present
and respond to a potential counterclaim by Frankish, in which
he defends his treatment of qualia realism for being compatible
with David Chalmers’ meta-problem.
Qualia & the Meta-Problem
A discussion about qualia in the 21st-century seems to always
begin with reference to Chalmers’ seminal hard problem—how
philosophy can account for conscious experience if our scientific
understanding of the functional, dynamical, and structural
properties of the brain cannot? (Chalmers 1995, 200). Chalmers’
critics note that his phrasing of the hard problem is misleading
because he relies on the a priori stipulation that brain processes
and conscious experiences are ontologically distinct. As a
result, Chalmers problematically dismisses the sizable literature
arguing that our gaps in theories of consciousness will be
overcome through advancements in neuroscientific research
(Schier & Carruthers 2017). With respect to that hypothesis,
many anti-qualia realists prefer the qualia-neutral perspective
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Chalmers adopts in the phrasing of his meta-problem: “why
do we ‘feel’ that qualia exist?” Unlike the hard problem,
the meta-problem does not insinuate that qualia properties
must necessarily exist in order to address the discrepancy
between our scientific understanding of brain processes and
our conscious experiences. At the same time, Chalmers’ metaproblem maintains that qualia realist arguments—such as the
introspective claim that qualia exist—must be reckoned with in
any theory of consciousness. To the advantage of both qualia
realists/anti-realists alike, embarking on the meta-problem will
either: (a) shed light on how to navigate the hard problem, or
(b) illuminate an avenue for a neurophysiological explanation
that thoughtfully addresses qualia realist concerns (Chalmers
2018).
Qualia & Intrinsic Subjectivity
According to Chalmers, anti-qualia realism’s response to the
meta-problem requires a robust explanation for qualia realists’
long-held intuitions. My paper will zero in on Chalmers’
metaphysical intuition that consciousness is intrinsic to an
individual’s subjective experience (Chalmers 2018). According
to Chalmers, the metaphysical intuition is indebted to
René Descartes’ argument that I can doubt all the external
relationships in the physical world, but I cannot doubt the fact
that I am conscious. Therefore, the datum I can be most certain
of is the fact that I am conscious (Descartes 1641).
We can see Descartes’ legacy in contemporary theories
claiming that qualia are “intrinsically subjective.” To claim a
property is “intrinsic” means that its existence can be grasped
independently from all other extrinsic properties. Attributing
the feature of “intrinsic” to subjective qualia properties implies
that qualia must necessarily be grasped by the subject directly
via first-hand experience (Langton & Lewis 1998). Qualia
theories of this kind draw upon Bertrand Russell’s insight into
the limitations of the material sciences—which are restricted
to structural-functional explanations—for its inability to
explain intrinsic natures (Russell 1927) . Inspired by Russell’s
views, Chalmers states, “the problem [referring to the hard
problem] is hard precisely because it is not a problem about
the performance of functions (Chalmers 1995). The problem
persists even when the performance of all relevant functions
are explained.” Positing that “qualia are intrinsic” resolves
Chalmers’ hard problem that our structural-functional brain
24

EPISTEME XXXIII

processes fail to account for subjective experience since
qualia serve the role as a “missing puzzle piece” that is nonstructural-functional. Simultaneously, the qualia-as-intrinsic
hypothesis addresses Russel’s concern that structural-functional
relationships as described in the material sciences cannot
account for intrinsic natures.
The qualia-as-intrinsic hypothesis may lead to two distinct
ontologies: a branch of Russellian monism claiming that qualia
are the only intrinsic properties of substances; a branch of
Cartesian dualism postulating that physical substances have
non-experiential intrinsic properties of which we may have no
knowledge, alongside experiential intrinsic properties of which
we can be certain of (i.e., one’s conscious experience) (Menon &
Siddarth 2017). The qualia realist perspectives discussed in this
paper opt for the first.
The Illusionist Position
Frankish’s theory of “illusionism” agrees with Chalmers’
claim that anti-qualia realists must provide a neuroscientific
explanation for why qualia theories are so pervasive. The
important difference is that illusionism insists that qualia
properties are not “real” in an ontological sense of the term
(Frankish 2016, 14). The illusionist approach is motivated
by the success of third-person empiricism in dissolving our
fallacious convictions about the natural world. When using
the term “third-person,” I am referring to neurophysiological
explanations that analyze qualia from a perspective that is
external to the subject of experience. Looking back at the history
of science, there is a strong case to be made for conducting
science from a third-person perspective. Most notably, the shift
from first-person empirical methodology, such as Aristotle’s
Ptolemaic worldview, is what allowed invaluable paradigm
shifts as Galileo’s Heliocentric worldview (Goff 2020).
In the following analogy, I will bolster Frankish’s conviction
that adopting a third-person perspective when investigating
qualia is advantageous. Now, imagine that you are looking
out towards the horizon of the desert. In the far distance, you
believe that you see a pool of water. Perhaps to your surprise,
a physicist comes along and explains to you how your eyes are
actually fooling you. They explain how when sunlight passes
through two layers of air with distinct temperatures, the two
air masses collide and appear like a mirror. Thus, the supposed
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“lake” is actually a reflection of the sky above. This fascinating
optical illusion is called “mirage” and is essentially analogous
to how illusionists hypothesize about qualia. Because we are so
radically misled by our immediate, perceptual representations
of the natural world, how are we to be certain about our firstperson intuitions about qualia-as-intrinsic? Frankish doubts the
epistemic reliability of qualia impressions, like how Descartes
considered that an “evil demon” could be deceiving his
impressions of the external world. Thus, Frankish proposes that
theories of consciousness should be informed by neuroscience,
such that our theories of consciousness are no longer “radically
at odds with that of the physical sciences” (Frankish 2016, 24).
The Panpsychist Challenge
My first criticism is that illusionism’s reliance on third-person
empiricism does not adequately address the qualia realist belief
that subjects of experience have inherent access to the nature
of qualia. To provide a concrete example of the impenetrability
of the qualia realist’s argument, I will be examining a qualia
theory posed by Philip Goff, a contemporary qualia realist.
According to Goff’s “real acquaintance hypothesis,” individuals
have direct, epistemic access to the intrinsic nature of qualia
in virtue of “being” in an experiential state (Goff 2015, 3).
For instance, Goff believes that one cannot be in the state of
pain and not have epistemic access to the essence of pain.
Therefore, the experience of pain is the essential property
of pain and constitutes the “real definition” of pain. In
Goff’s real acquaintance hypothesis, we see the influence of
Descartes’ argument that one can doubt the external referent
of experience—such as the neurophysiological basis of the
pain experience—but we cannot doubt that we are having a
conscious experience (Menon & Siddarth 2017, 411). In the same
way, Goff claims that simply being in an experiential state of
pain allows one to grasp the intrinsic nature of that state.
I will be considering ways that Frankish could possibly
respond to Goff’s “real acquaintance hypothesis” based on the
information he provides (Goff 2015, 3). First, Frankish might
be tempted to refute that only subjects with “introspective
mechanisms” possess the capacity to have perceptual illusions
of qualia (Frankish 2016, 14). In this sense, Frankish’s refutation
relies on cases where our perceptual faculties cause misleading
misrepresentations of the nature of the world (e.g., the
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mirage). The problem is that analyzing a human’s capacity for
introspection from a cognitive perspective does not reach the
heart of Goff’s claim about intrinsic subjectivity. Goff argues
that consciousness arises simply from “being,” allowing for a
direct acquaintance to the intrinsic nature of one’s subjective
experience through simply having that experience. Notably,
there is nothing contained in Goff’s view that necessitates
any particular process involving the brain whatsoever (e.g.,
the capacity for introspection, mental representations, goaldirected behavior, etc.). Rather, according to Goff’s formulation,
any “subject”—in a very broad sense of the term—has the
capacity for intrinsic subjectivity (Goff 2015, 10). Goff’s “real
acquaintance” hypothesis puts pressure on illusionism since
its prioritization of first-person empiricism is antithetical to
Frankish’s commitment to third-person empiricism.
Goff’s particular perspective on qualia can be broadly
categorized under the umbrella term “panpsychism.” In brief,
panpsychism encompasses a large sum of theories throughout
the history of philosophy. Pansychist views profess that
consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural
world. The most contentious element of panpsychism is the
claim that inanimate objects are conscious. Panpsychists will
go as far as claiming “thermostats are conscious,” an assertion
that challenges how we colloquially use the term “conscious” in
association with human cognition (Chalmers 1995). I will omit
a detailed history of panpsychism because it is irrelevant to
my following point about illusionism’s inability to adequately
address panpsychism’s principles according to the merit of its’
own methodology.
Although Frankish’s addressment of panpsychism is brief, I
argue that it shows an important way that illusionism fails
to sufficiently address the essential components of qualia
directly. Frankish simply claims that the neuroscientist’s
inability to vindicate their assertions—such as thermostats
having conscious experience—is justification for accusing
them of fabricating a “fiction” (Frankish 2016, 32). Here,
Frankish’s justification is problematic because it is antithetical
to his anti-first-person intuitional approach. Supposedly, the
key advantage of relying upon third-person neuroscientific
explanations is to overcome the fact that our introspectively
derived impressions about our conscious experiences are
systematically misleading. After all, Frankish’s argument relies
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heavily on the assertion that our attitudes towards theories of
consciousness cannot rest on superficial attitudes about what
theories of consciousness ought to be like. Instead, we ought
to be persuaded by the theory that is the most “rationally
compelling” (Frankish 2016, 37). With respect to that rationale,
it is hypocritical for the illusionist to fight the panpsychist
intuition by merely retorting their own intuition that antiqualia realism can rely on advancements in neuroscience.
The hypocrisy lies in the fact that, instead of relying on his
methodology to dismantle “intrinsic subjectivity” as a cognitive
illusion, Frankish seems to merely protest that intrinsic
subjectivity is not a conveniently discernable concept for the
purpose of neuroscientific research.
According to my analysis, the qualia realist who holds intrinsic
subjectivity would have the upper hand against Frankish in the
panpsychist debate. When the qualia realist claims “intrinsically
subjective,” they are not only making a case about the ontology
of qualia, but they are also simultaneously designating the
constraints on how philosophy can accommodate qualia in
a scientific worldview. From that perspective, de-bunking
qualia realism is not a matter of acquiring a more detailed
understanding of cognitive mechanisms, as Frankish would
hope (Frankish 2016, 37). Adhering to the definition of
“intrinsically subjective,” a qualia realist would say that
even if a neuroscientist were to provide the most complete,
neurophysiological explanation of our conscious experience,
they would be failing to grasp his point about that conscious
experience is necessarily grasped by the subject’s first-person
experience, and not by any other means (Goff 2017, 7). To that
extent, Frankish’s hands are tied, unless he is able to provide
a neuroscientific account about why panpsychists are being
systematically deceived about their beliefs that thermostats are
conscious.
I argue that even if Frankish attempted to directly address the
component of intrinsic subjectivity, his proposed explanation
would fail to be compelling compared to the panpsychist.
Recall, for illusionism to prevail against qualia realism, the
anti-qualia realist must explain why our conscious experiences
seem to have an additional quality that feels to be “intrinsically
subjective” but is actually an illusion. Frankish generally
addresses the challenge of explaining our perception of qualia
in neuroscientific terms as the “illusion problem.”
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When speaking of the illusion problem, Frankish provides a
general schema for how philosophy can interpret the qualia
realist’s claims about the nature of conscious experience. When
the qualia realist insists upon the ontological distinctiveness of
consciousness, Frankish insists they are deceived by systematic
illusions caused by their perceptual faculties. He uses the term
“quasi-phenomenal property” as a place-holder term for the
cognitive process underpinning the qualia realist’s beliefs about
qualia (Frankish 2016, 16). For example, when qualia realists
claim that their visual experience of red has the property of
“phenomenal redness,” the illusionist says that physical quasiphenomenal properties “trigger” introspective representations
of phenomenal redness. In other words, the qualia realist’s
perception of phenomenal redness is an illusory perception that
subsists on top of their perceptual visual experience of red.
What is significant is that Frankish’s construal does not consist
of showing how quasi-phenomenal properties are real. Rather,
Frankish merely posits that when the qualia realist claims that
they have “direct access” to the nature of qualia, they have
no way of knowing that what they are referring to is a quasiphenomenal property. Essentially, Frankish’s accusation can be
summarized in the following question: how would the qualia
realist know the difference between a phenomenal property
(i.e., qualia) or a quasi-phenomenal property if they are cast
under an illusion? (Frankish 2016, 9-20).
I agree with Frankish’s accusation that the anti-qualia realist
would not be able to tell the difference if a quasi-phenomenal
property is triggering their beliefs about qualia rather than a
phenomenal property. However, that same logic can be used
against illusionism as well, as Frankish himself cannot prove
that quasi-phenomenal properties are causing systematic
illusions about qualia. To that extent, the qualia realist’s
argument that actual qualia are what cause beliefs about qualia
are relatively more parsimonious. In comparison, the illusionist
would have to make concessions to explain why our cognitive
mechanisms cause us to have systematic illusions about nonexistent qualia. Frankish makes no concrete attempt to address
this problem of why we would have systematic illusions about
the nature of our conscious experience.
The Private Language Conflict
In my preceding argument, I showed that Frankish does not
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provide a compelling case that qualia’s constitutive property
of intrinsic subjectivity can be explained as a cognitive illusion.
In order to close the case that Frankish could not in fact pindown intrinsic subjectivity on any other account, I will be reimagining Ludwig Wittgenstein’s infamous “private language”
thought experiment (Wittgenstein 1953, §244-§271). My purpose
in this endeavor is to provide a convincing case that Frankish
cannot simply rely on advancements in neuroscience to provide
a coherent neuroscientific explanation of qualia’s intrinsic
subjectivity as an illusion.
With reference to the “private language” thought experiment,
let us imagine that a neuroscientist enters a room full of
philosophers, each holding a box that cannot be opened. In
order to make some sense of the situation, the philosophers
agree on the assertion, “there is something called a ‘beetle’
inside of my box.” As the neuroscientist is a staunch adherent
to third-person empiricism—over and above all—she believes
that the philosophers cannot prove that there are “beetles”
inside of any of their boxes. After reading Frankish, her gameplan is to discover the complex array of neural correlates that
underpin the philosopher’s “beetle” illusion. Her trusted tool
is the fMRI machine, as hopefully, that will allow her to map
the philosopher’s first-hand reports about “beetles” onto their
brain activity. Assuming she succeeds in finding these neural
correlates, perhaps then the philosophers will concede that their
“beetle” is nothing more than a complex array of neural firings.
Unfortunately for the neuroscientist, her enterprise is precluded
by the philosophers’ definition of what beetles are. As she
attempts to analyze the neural correlates of the philosopher’s
belief propositions, the content of the philosopher’s firsthand reports proclaims that she cannot possibly see what
lies inside the various boxes. Specifically, her problem is that
the philosophers have agreed this concept is “intrinsically
subjective”—analogous to how philosophers conceive of
qualia as exclusively accessible to the subject of experience.
What exactly can the neuroscientist find the neural correlates
of then? The challenge for the neuroscientist is that her only
vehicle of explanation is the fMRI machine, but that does not
equip her with the capacity to make a philosophical argument
that third-person empiricism should be trusted over and above
the philosopher’s claims. If her research program is under
the supervision of Frankish, then her mode of explanation
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is restricted within the bounds of what neural correlates can
explain.
Of course, many philosophers have given strong theoretical
arguments against the beetle-in-the-box dilemma that support
Frankish’s convictions, but they do not rely on specific
neuroscientific evidence whatsoever. Most infamously, the
anti-qualia realist, Daniel Dennett, claims the beetle-inthe-box problem justifies canceling the “language game”
altogether. Specifically, Dennett proclaims that qualia—like
the beetle—has derived its meaning based on how it has been
constructed via philosophical argumentation (Dennett 1998, 4).
His interpretation scathingly undermines qualia’s “intrinsic”
quality because language is inherently relational (i.e., extrinsic).
On this basis, we can eliminate this concept from our ontology
because we have no objective, third-person proof that qualia
exist.
Unlike Dennett, Frankish does not outright dismiss the qualia
realist’s feeling of qualia’s intrinsic subjectivity. He claims that,
despite qualia not being “real,” our intuitions about qualia
substantially reflect how our cognitive mechanisms evaluate
conscious experience (Frankish 2016, 15). When confronting
Chalmer’s meta-problem, Frankish believes that the antiqualia realist must explain why the qualia realist holds the
principle of intrinsic subjectivity from a neurophysiological
perspective. Frankish is determined to confront such qualia
concerns because, quite obviously, Dennett’s dismissal thirty
years prior was unsatisfying for the qualia realists. In fact,
philosophers continually re-imagine thought experiments like
the “beetle-in-the-box” as a justification to push qualia realism
more aggressively. They might consider, “if public language
is extrinsic and relational, then how will I ever determine if
what I refer to as a “beetle” is the same as yours?” According to
qualia realists, questions about intersubjective experience are
important and worth pursuing. Yet if the qualia realist claims
the subject’s privileged access to their own qualia ultimately
bears the truth of the matter, then the neuroscientist is blocked
from offering further insight.
Illusionism & The Meta-Problem
Although I maintain that illusionism fails to address qualia’s
constitutive component of intrinsic subjectivity, there is
an advantage to Frankish’s willingness to accept qualia’s
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constitutive features in his argument. Particularly, when
facing Chalmers’ meta-problem, illusionism seems like the
most agreeable anti-qualia realist position. Unlike Dennett
who dismisses the epistemic reliability of the qualia realists’
claims, illusionism thoughtfully considers the constitutive
features of qualia as described by the qualia realist. Frankish
achieves this common ground by willfully accepting the core
arguments like Chalmer’s metaphysical intuition. Returning
to my mirage analogy, Frankish does not simply tell the
person standing in the desert: “you do not actually see a lake
in front of you because your experience does not exist as
such.” Instead, Frankish argues that there ought to be a robust,
causal explanation that does justice to the verisimilitude of the
subject’s conscious experience of the mirage.
Since Frankish conveys a non-dismissive attitude towards
qualia realism beliefs (e.g., qualia are irreducible), Chalmers
says that he would identify as an illusionist if he was forced
to pick another position (Chalmers 2018, 8). Appealing to
qualia realists is integral because, quite obviously, they are the
ones who need convincing. To be clear, I am not implying that
Chalmers is the righteous authority who gets to make the final
call about which solution to the meta-problem is ultimately
“right.” Rather, I am identifying a key explanatory advantage of
illusionism in its ability to advance the discussion by agreeing
with the qualia realist’s definition. In this sense, Frankish could
refute my argument by claiming that it is unsatisfactory for
anti-qualia realists to dismiss the qualia realist’s reports about
what their conscious experience feels like at face value. Frankish
voices this motivation in his response to his fellow anti-qualia
realists (e.g., Nicholas Humphrey, Peter Mandik)—as he
argues that anti-qualia realists present an “inclusive attitude”
towards the qualia realist’s claims about the nature of conscious
experience (Frankish 2016, 16).
In response, I argue that Frankish’s “inclusive attitude” is also
his greatest shortcoming, as he is unable to explain how his
methodology can penetrate the concept of intrinsic subjectivity.
Frankish’s whole theory of illusionism is based on the premise
that neuroscience may eventually explain our beliefs about
conscious experience (Frankish 2016, 16). Since Frankish does
not have a neuroscientific explanation for why qualia realists
believe that qualia are intrinsically subjective, he must rely on
his intuition that qualia are not causing these beliefs. To that
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extent, his response is equally as unscientific and unfounded
in third-person empirical evidence as the qualia realist position
that he criticizes. In other words, Frankish’s own perspective
on qualia-as-intrinsic is not substantiated by the neuroscientific
explanations which he holds as the golden standard for theories
of consciousness.
Conclusion
In summary, I argue that Frankish’s theory of illusionism is illequipped for dismantling intrinsic subjectivity as a constitutive
component of qualia. First, I explained the history of the qualia
realism debate and why Frankish is compelled to confront
Chalmer’s metaphysical intuition that qualia are intrinsically
subjective. I argued that Frankish’s illusionist methodology fails
to properly address qualia’s component of intrinsic subjectivity
in two different contexts: Goff’s theory of panpsychism, a
theory of consciousness that holds intrinsic subjectivity as a
core feature, and my re-imagining of Wittgenstein’s “private
language” thought experiment.
Ultimately, Frankish’s fatal error is his willingness to accept
whatever qualia intuitions are thrown upon him and to merely
rely on advancements in neuroscience to address them. The
tragic fate for anti-qualia realism is that advancements in
neuroscience may eventually provide substantive explanations
for every other constitutive feature of qualia (e.g., ineffability,
irreducibility). Nevertheless, the illusionist’s explanation for
intrinsic subjectivity will always seem like it is missing the
point of what “intrinsic subjectivity” truly means.
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to argue that panpsychism entails the
value of everything. The argument is supported through an
axiological analysis of the value of consciousness demonstrating
that consciousness is intrinsically valuable. Moreover, if
consciousness is intrinsically valuable then it follows that any
entity with consciousness must then be intrinsically valuable in
virtue of possessing it. Thus, under the posit of panpsychism
(i.e., consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature
of nature), all of nature must be valuable. In this paper,
arguments for and against the value of consciousness are
considered, outlined, and discussed. From there, an axiology of
panpsychism is argued for wherein the most primitive entities
to the most sophisticated systems are valuable. Finally, some
implications and prescriptions are considered.
1 Introduction
The intuition that the cosmos is intrinsically and wholly
valuable is deeply entrenched in much of how we describe our
everyday observations about the world. For instance, when
we marvel at the intricacies and peculiarities of fundamental
particle physics, or are captivated by large-scale planetary
motion, the valuable aspects of nature appear pervasive. The
symmetry and order of the cosmos, which appears beautiful
to us, makes it difficult to withhold the conviction that it is
intrinsically beautiful, and hence valuable. Nevertheless,
there is no consensus as to whether or not this intuition is
consistent with reality. I aim to address this by using theories
of panpsychism as the foundation from which to build an
axiological model of our world.
At the outset of this paper, to lay the groundwork for an
axiology of panpsychism, we must first understand three
of its central aspects. First, panpsychism is the thesis that
consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of
reality (Seager, 2020). Second, axiology is a broad discipline
of inquiry that investigates values; their nature, variety, and
interrelationships (Drob, 2011). Third, consciousness, which
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is commonly defined as “the subjective quality of experience”
(Chalmers, 2007). When combined, the axioms upholding
theories of panpsychism and theories of consciousness have
powerful implications for either a value-laden or value-less
axiology, contingent on whether or not consciousness itself
is valuable. While a variety of literature has argued that
consciousness is not only valuable, but intrinsically valuable
(Siewert, 1998; Kriegel, 2019; Seager, 2001), others have argued
that consciousness is less valuable than we think, or potentially
value-neutral (or value-absent) (Lee, 2018; Levy, 2014; Kahane
and Savulescu, 2009). Hence, if the value-laden theorists are
correct, this suggests that, under the thesis of panpsychism, the
cosmos itself must be value-laden. However, if the value-less
theorists are correct, then the reverse would hold.
In considering the positions, I argue that the contentions against
the intrinsic value of consciousness do not carry weight when
framed correctly. I aim to demonstrate that consciousness
is not only valuable but intrinsically valuable. Using the
paradigm of the panpsychist, the intrinsically valuable nature of
consciousness entails the intrinsic value of all entities.
In defending my view, I first examine reasons to believe
that consciousness is or is not valuable. Here, I differentiate
phenomenal consciousness (i.e., “there is something that it
is like” to have that subjective experience) (Nagel, 1974) in
particular, from access consciousness (i.e., the ability to access
cognitive events such as memories or skills) (Block, 1995). The
argument I forward for the value of consciousness is directed
at phenomenal consciousness in particular although access
consciousness can give us some insight into the axiological
significance of consciousness. Second, I lay out the arguments
against the intrinsically valuable nature of consciousness and
refute them in turn by suggesting that they misunderstand the
role of phenomenal consciousness in the world. I will also be
differentiating intrinsic value (i.e., good ‘in and of itself’) from
instrumental value (i.e., good ‘as a function of what it can do’)
(Schroeder, 2016).
Ultimately, using the foundation of my prior conclusions, I
describe the relationship between the value of consciousness
and the axiology of panpsychism. Here, I outline how theories
of panpsychism have developed over the years, why they have
been posited, and if they can be made consistent with other
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modern theories of consciousness. Last, I will extrapolate how
the intrinsically valuable nature of consciousness would fit
into our picture of reality via the application of a panpsychist
paradigm, extending to a ubiquitously valuable picture of
nature itself.
2 Axiology and Phenomenal Consciousness
2.1 Value: Intrinsic and Instrumental
Value entails evaluative properties such as “goodness, badness,
having such-and-such amount of utility, having so-and-so
degree of well-being, the better-than relation, and so forth”
(Cutter, 2017). Axiology, the study of value, comprises three
main branches—epistemic, aesthetic, and moral value—and
questions associated with the relationship between these
branches and the aforementioned evaluative properties. Finally,
value can either be intrinsic or instrumental.
Intrinsic value defines something as valuable, “in its own
right” (Zimmerman & Bradley, 2019). That is, something that
is intrinsically good is “non-derivatively good” (Zimmerman
& Bradley, 2019) in that the goodness of the thing is grounded
in itself—therefore, its goodness is reflexive. It differs from
instrumental value in that if something is instrumentally good,
its goodness is derivative i.e., its goodness is grounded in
something other than itself.
To clarify, let us consider a potentially ambiguous value
discussed by Zimmerman and Bradley (2019), namely,
‘health,’ and see whether it is better defined as intrinsically
or instrumentally valuable (or both). Let us assume that we
think health is intrinsically good, in the way that Zimmerman
and Bradley do, what would that mean? Well, it would be
something to the effect that health is intrinsically good for the
person who possesses it i.e., it seems in the best interest of the
person, let’s say “John” to value being healthy (Zimmerman &
Bradley, 2019).
While the value of health may be sufficient to explain why
someone engages in a behavior, such as exercise, to enhance
or protect their health. Health, even in this case, does not
necessarily seem to be intrinsically valuable because the
supposed intrinsic value of health is completely reliant on
instrumental reasons for valuing it i.e., health serves the
instrumental purpose of enhancing quality of life.
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Suppose both John and Jane have illnesses that cause them
to be bed-ridden for weeks. The illness prevents John from
traveling to his dream destination; therefore, he evaluates the
illness as ‘intrinsically bad’. Jane, to the contrary, receives the
attention and care that she has always sought as a result of
the illness; therefore, Jane evaluates the illness as ‘intrinsically
good’. The value assigned to health in this example, I argue,
is actually derivative in that it is derived from the evaluative
perspective of the person making a value judgment. Moreover,
health is valuable for John because health is perhaps necessary
for him to act on his surroundings, enjoy his life, engage in
social activities, and so forth, whereas for Jane lacking health
is perhaps necessary to receive attention and care. While in
most cases health is evaluated as good, there are exceptions
such as Jane’s case. Moreover, all of the functions that health
facilitates are instrumentally valuable. Thus, health seems to be
contingent on something other than the ‘state of being healthy’
to determine its value. The value of health is contingent on
the evaluative perspective of the subject making the value
judgment. That is, if health did not have instrumental value
or someone to evaluate the value of health, then health would
not be valuable because its value is contingent on it serving an
external purpose for the subject. Hence, health is instrumentally
valuable, not intrinsically valuable.
With these considerations in mind, we are now in a position to
ask whether or not consciousness is better characterized as an
intrinsic and/or instrumental value and determine if it features
the necessary axiological aspects.
2.2 The Axiological Value of Phenomenal Consciousness
The axiological value of access consciousness may seem selfevident i.e., it allows us to use knowledge to benefit our lives,
to use moral judgment to build relationships with others,
to live good lives, and to feel pleasure through aesthetically
appreciating the world around us. With that said, let us
consider if phenomenal consciousness features the necessary
axiological aspects. That is, is phenomenal consciousness
epistemically, aesthetically, or ethically valuable?
One way to envisage whether or not phenomenal consciousness
has value is to imagine removing it. A common philosophical
way of doing this is through the zombie thought experiment
(Siewert, 2002). Imagine yourself duplicated via some kind of
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science fiction duplication machine. The person that comes
out of the duplicator has all of the same physical attributes,
the same abilities, the same psychological makeup, but it
is missing one crucial feature, their conscious experience.
For example, while asleep, we still have a phenomenally
conscious experience in that we can be conscious of dreams,
yet your zombie twin would have no such experience. They
have fully intact access consciousness e.g., memory retrieval,
prediction, etc., but no phenomenal consciousness of the
ordinary perceptual content we are accustomed to derived
from sensation. To be clear, the qualitative part of any typically
sensory experience e.g., appreciation of taste or touch, is part
of phenomenal consciousness. Now ask yourself, would you
comfortably trade lives with your duplicate? Intuitively, it
seems that taking on the life of your so-called zombie twin is
akin to non-existence. Why is that? It seems there is something
here that makes our phenomenally conscious experience
valuable that is separate from its instrumental cognitive
functions.
Cutter (2017) argues that consciousness has axiological
significance in that “the existence and character of conscious
experience in a world (or in one’s life) makes a difference to
the overall goodness or badness of the world (or the overall
goodness or badness of one’s life)”. Hence, if the phenomenally
conscious experience makes a difference to the goodness or
badness of the world, then it follows that consciousness plays
some role in determining the axiological significance of any
given feature of the world.
2.3 Objection to the Value of Consciousness and Reply
One objection to this line of argumentation is made by Levy
(2014),
“My zombie twin has a point of view. He sees the world from a
particular perspective, in an attitude-infused way. Indeed, his
idiosyncratic take on things is identical to mine…he is inclined
to say that he values these things, and I am inclined to agree
with him”.
To respond, I grant that the zombie twin has ‘a point of view’ in
that they can interface with their environment. However, that
point of view is not phenomenally conscious and therefore is
not ‘attitude-infused’ which is necessary for my zombie twin to

EPISTEME XXXIII

value things.
On the evaluative-attitudinal account of desire and will,
“goodness shows up as an aspect of the desire’s attitude, of
how the desire presents what it does, rather than as an aspect
of its content, of what the desire presents” (Kriegel, 2018). For
instance, when observed, my zombie twin and I seem to desire
chocolate because we ask for chocolate. However, the difference
is that my zombie twin has a belief that chocolate’s goodness
‘presents as true’ whereas to me, chocolate merely ‘presents
as good’ as a result of my attitude towards chocolate (Kriegel,
2018). Therefore, my desire for chocolate reflects my implicit
attitude towards it, where their desire reflects their beliefs
about it. My attitude is a phenomenal feature of my conscious
experience where my beliefs are a cognitive feature. Another
way to think of this is that my attitude toward the chocolate is
‘full’ whereas my zombie twin’s attitude toward the chocolate
is ‘empty’ because my zombie twin has no presentation or
justification for how the chocolate tastes.
If you understand ‘a zombie twin’ the way Levy construes,
you might as well be reflecting on what it would be like to
have an actual twin or a replica. To be clear, a zombie twin,
hypothetically, would only be able to act on stimulus inputs
from the external world and respond with the requisite
behavioral output, analogous to a super-sophisticated
automaton, via its access conscious experience. While the
zombie twin would make decisions identical to your own, it is
on the basis of cognitive representations—it is not consciously
aware of its decisions in the traditional, phenomenal sense.
Hence, there would be “nothing it is like” to be your zombie
twin.
3 The Intrinsic Value of Consciousness
3.1 Phenomenal Consciousness and Intrinsic Moral,
Epistemic, and Aesthetic Values
In this section, I will discuss arguments supporting the intrinsic
moral, epistemic, and aesthetic value of consciousness. To begin
with, Siewert (1998) argues that the zombie thought experiment
demonstrates that not only do we intrinsically value our own
phenomenally rich sensory and cognitive lives, we also value
others’ possession of phenomenal consciousness (Siewert, 1998).
That is, consider the following thought experiment where you
have one of three choices: (1) Others having the phenomenally
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rich conscious life we expect and hope them to have with all
of the phenomenal properties we normally experience such
as color, emotion, and pleasure; (2) Their zombified existence
with all the access, or non-phenomenal benefits such as
planning and calculating; or (3) Their being destroyed and
replaced by a zombie twin. He argues that if you view persons
as irreplaceable, as a function of them being phenomenally
conscious, then there is a way in which we “regard phenomenal
consciousness as essential to personhood” (Siewert, 1998) or as I
am construing it, ‘personal identity’ or ‘subjectivity.’ Moreover,
on some moral accounts, personhood (i.e., personal identity) is
required for moral value. So, the argument is as follows,
P1: Phenomenal consciousness is a necessary condition
of personhood
P2: Personhood is a sufficient condition for intrinsic
moral value

P3: If personhood is intrinsically morally valuable, then
some property of personhood gives it intrinsic moral
value
Using abduction,
C: Phenomenal consciousness gives personhood
intrinsic moral value
To highlight the moral intrinsic value of consciousness,
Kantian Deontology situates personhood at the center of
moral consideration because persons are able to ‘set their
own ends’ i.e., they can have interests that are important to
them. In having interests, persons can set ends for themselves
which gives them dignity (i.e., inherent, inalienable rights)
(Kant, GM, 4:429). Hence, dignity presupposes personhood
and personhood presupposes phenomenal consciousness.
Kriegel (2020) argues that the ground of dignity is precisely
phenomenal consciousness.. I argue, adding onto Siewert
and Kriegel, our understanding of personhood, dignity,
and phenomenal consciousness indicate that they are all
inextricable. Thus, Kriegel states, “on the emerging view, an
entity exacts respect and merits treatment as an end just if it is
a phenomenally conscious creature”. Concisely, any entity with
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phenomenal consciousness has moral value.
Next, the epistemic intrinsic value of consciousness is argued
by Bourget (2017) where he puts forward his phenomenal
theory of epistemic grasping. To define, the theory argues: “To
occurrently grasp P is to have a phenomenal experience with
P as content” (Bourget, 2017). Our phenomenal experience
allows us to ‘grasp’ the content of a proposition. That is when
we are given the proposition, ‘the sun is 1,300,000 times
bigger than the Earth,’ we grasp Q and not P. To grasp the
P of the proposition, we need the help of a representative
model such as an apple seed vs. basketball (Bourget, 2017).
Therefore, grasping is one way in which consciousness is
intrinsically epistemically valuable because it gives the subject
“presentational phenomenology whereby the subject seems to
be aware of the truth-maker of P” (Kriegel, 2020). To illustrate,
your zombie twin cannot experience ‘grasping’ due to their lack
of phenomenal consciousness, hence any assertion that they
‘grasped’ the proposition ‘the sun is 1,300,000 times bigger than
the Earth’ would be false.
Last, the aesthetic intrinsic value of consciousness, Kriegel
argues, can be arrived at through contemplation of the “socalled explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness
and the rest of the natural order, a certain intellectual type of
awe descends on us” (Kriegel, 2020) akin to the experience
of the sublime. Hence, if in contemplating its own nature,
consciousness induces awe, and “being a fitting object of awe is
the mark of the sublime” (Kriegel, 2020), then consciousness is
intrinsically aesthetically valuable.
3.2 Criticisms of the Intrinsic Value of Consciousness and
Responses
3.2.1 The Argument from Moral Responsibility
To begin, let’s consider the argument of two opponents of
the intrinsic value of phenomenal consciousness, Savulescu
and Kahane (2009). They argue the following with respect to
individuals experiencing a locked-in state,
“The totally locked-in brain-damaged patients we are
now considering have no capacity for communication,
no external agency, and at most only limited (and
completely passive) perceptual input… Their lives
have gone very badly since entering this state and
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if it continues unaltered, may go on being very bad.
It is far from obvious that such lives are still worth
living. If so, then even if using fMRI we can establish
that brain-damaged patients still enjoy phenomenal
consciousness…terminating these patients’ lives might
be morally required, not merely permissible.”
Savulescu and Kahane (2009) refer to access consciousness as
sapience i.e., the degree to which we as humans can behave/
act on our desires and will. While it may be true that patients
experiencing locked-in syndrome would prefer to end their
life rather than to continue their phenomenally conscious
experience due to a lack of sapience, in some cases, it may be
morally required to terminate their life as a way to alleviate
their suffering. This demonstrates a case where consciousness
has lost its instrumental value, not its intrinsic value. That is,
in cases such as these, the instrumental value of a conscious
agency is made null by the locked-in state.
Moreover, the state could demonstrate too intense a burden to
continue living as a result. However, this line of argumentation
does not demonstrate that phenomenal consciousness is
not valuable since being in a locked-in state diminishes the
instrumental value of consciousness, not its intrinsic value.
Consciousness’s intrinsic value lies in its ability to ground the
value of other things (including, I argue, itself), positively or
negatively. Insofar as the locked-in patient is conscious, they
can still ground the value of pleasant or unpleasant music, for
example. In other words, if phenomenal consciousness did not
ground value, then I would be indifferent to my condition (in
the locked-in state) altogether.
Additionally, it is important here to accurately characterize the
experience of locked-in patients. Damasio (2000) during clinical
research asked patients subsequent to coming out of the state
to report on their experience. The majority of locked-in patients
described the state as “tranquil or calm” (Damasio, 2000). On
the negative end, an autobiography written by a locked-in
patient during the state using only eyeblinks indicated that the
state caused them to experience a plethora of emotions ranging
from sadness to disappointment to frustration (Bauby 1997) but
never expressed suicidal sentiments.
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3.2.2 The Argument from ‘The Philosophers Hell’
Kriegel (2019) states that if we consider hedonism the central
moral account, “we only need to add that pleasure and pain
contribute to well-being in virtue of their phenomenology
to obtain intrinsic prudential value for phenomenal
consciousness”. From here, a criticism is put forward by Lee
(2018) which relies on hedonic valence. He states “when the
philosopher in Hell thinks about the axiology of consciousness,
they might be drawn towards neither the positive view nor the
neutral view, but instead the negative view, according to which
consciousness is intrinsically dis-valuable”.
One contention is that pain is instrumentally valuable in
giving us information about the world but is intrinsically disvaluable since its hedonic value is negative. Here, I hold that
the phenomenally conscious experience of pain can either
be instrumentally valuable or dis-valuable, depending on
the epistemic value it confers and our ability to act on that
epistemic information. That is, if the pain is informative,
then it is instrumental. If pain is uninformative, then it is not
instrumental. Nevertheless, in both cases, the phenomenally
conscious experience of pain retains its intrinsic epistemic value
and its intrinsic moral value even if it loses its intrinsic aesthetic
value. That is, we still ‘know something about the world’ and
we still ‘know something about the difference between right
and wrong’ in virtue of the experience even if there is nothing
intrinsically aesthetically valuable, or pleasurable about being
phenomenally conscious in hell. Importantly, I grant that the
displeasure combined with the lack of instrumentality may
make it preferable to be unconscious than conscious in hell. So,
I agree with Kriegel that hedonic valence, while important to
value, is not its sole determinate.
4 An Axiological Model of Panpsychism
4.1 Historic and Contemporary Theories of Panpsychism
Panpsychism’s origins begin in a prehistoric animist (i.e.,
all objects have spirit) worldview. However, from that
origin, panpsychism can be found in the traditions of Greek
philosophers (e.g., Aristotle argued “all existing things…seek
[their] own special good…” (Skrbina, 2005)) and onwards to
modern conceptions (Skrbina, 2005). I argue the depiction of
panpsychism as ‘occurring through the ages’ adds credence to
the impact of panpsychism on modern thinking.
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To demonstrate, intermediate to ancient and modern
philosophy, Cavendish, a 17th Century renaissance philosopher,
argued for an ontology nearly indistinguishable from that of
most modern panpsychists. In her Observations, she argues
that ubiquitous reason is necessary to explain the variety and
orderliness of the natural world. That is, she argues “I believe
there is sense and reason and rational knowledge, not only in
all creatures but in every part of every particular creature”.
Hence, she argues “all parts of Nature, even the inanimate,
have an innate and [fixed] self-knowledge, [and] it is probable
that they may also have an interior self-knowledge (Cavendish,
1655/1991)” (Skrbina, 2005). Thus, the Reason that Cavendish
attributes pervasively throughout nature is that which animates
and organizes it. I argue that if we presuppose panpsychism,
nature’s basic Reason as attributed by Cavendish is akin to its
fundamental conscious property.
Goff, a current-day proponent of panpsychism argues that the
view’s plausibility lies in its ability to solve two distinct modern
philosophical problems i.e., the hard problem of consciousness
(‘how can the firing of neurons give rise to qualitative
experience e.g., color?’) and the problem of the intrinsic nature
of matter (‘what explains the intrinsic nature of fundamental
particles?’) (Barrientos, 2021).
Goff argues that panpsychism has determinate answers to
both of these problems. In response to the first problem, he
argues that our brains and conscious states emerge together as
a result of combinations of billions of basic conscious particles
assembled in the right way (Goff 2017) due to the dispositions
of the particles to organize in that particular way. Furthermore,
he argues that panpsychism can explain brains as consciousness
manifested i.e., the brain as a consciousness producing physical
piece of matter is the way that it is because of the organizing
dispositions that the more fundamental parts or particles have.
Moreover, he argues that this is the explanation that best fits
the criteria of Occam’s razor because it adheres parsimoniously
with our scientific narrative of how the world works. That is, in
response to the second problem of the intrinsic nature of matter,
Goff states,
“…the only thing we know about the intrinsic nature of
matter is that some of it— the stuff in brains—involves
experience…we either suppose that the intrinsic nature
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of fundamental particles involves experience, or we
suppose that they have some entirely unknown intrinsic
nature… On the former supposition, the nature of
macroscopic things is continuous with the nature of
microscopic things. The latter supposition leads us to
complexity, discontinuity, and mystery. The theoretical
imperative to form as simple and unified a view as is
consistent with the data leads us quite straightforwardly
in the direction of panpsychism” (Aeon, 2019)
Parsimony leads us to an interpretation of nature that has
consciousness as a fundamental feature of matter since at
least some matter, namely brains, have consciousness. If that
is the case, we need some explanation for how that occurs.
Panpsychism, I argue, provides a plausible and parsimonious
explanation for the existence of consciousness.
4.2 Objections to Panpsychism and Solutions
Contemporary objections to Panpsychism are typically depicted
by the following series of retorts i.e., it’s ‘contrary to commonsense’, ‘how do basic conscious ‘simples’ combine to create
complex consciousness?’, and ‘what a ‘conscious subject is’ is
arbitrary’. Here, I will discuss these objections and outline some
responses.
The argument against common-sense states that it is counterintuitive to attribute consciousness to things such as rocks
and tables. That is, Goff (2019) writes, “common sense tells us
that only living things have an inner life…panpsychists deny
this datum of common sense. According to panpsychism…
an electron has an inner life”. To many, this provides a strong
reason to deny panpsychism. However, Goff responds that
common sense has often led us astray. For example, other
common-sense theories have been proven incorrect such as
the geocentric model of the universe, Newton’s theory of
gravitation, or naïve set-theory. Additionally, Roelofs (2019)
argues that it is possible to reconcile panpsychism with our
‘great chain of being’ (GCOB) intuitions. That is, we can trust
GCOB if we are using it to paraphrase about consciousnesses
that are close to ours such as a dog being more like us than an
ant, for example. Hence, panpsychism does not discount all of
our intuitions about consciousness.
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The next problem facing panpsychism is the combination
problem. The combination problem asks, how do subatomic
particles join together to form consciousness? One solution to
this problem is the fusion view forwarded by Mørch (2019)
(and by Seager (2010)). Mørch writes that the fusion view of
mental combination is “when micro-or proto-conscious entities
come together in the right way, they fuse…together to form
a single unified consciousness”. Moreover, “the new macroconsciousness thereby replaces the original micro- or proto
consciousness…before fusion, the particles of the brain were
each individually realized by their own micro-consciousness,
but after fusion, the same particles become jointly realized by a
single macro-consciousness instead.”. Hence, the combination
problem can be solved by positing fusion conditions for
complex consciousness.
Finally, there is the arbitrary conscious subjects’ problem.
That is, where do we “draw the line” when attributing
consciousness/subjecthood to various entities? Are there micro
subjects that form macro subjects? Or is everything conscious
in the same way? Well, as noted above, it seems like the fusion
solution is able to solve this contention. Nevertheless, another
solution ‘Combinationism’ forwarded by Roelofs (2019) argues
that, “all elementary particles are associated with incredibly
simple experiences, whose structure is no more complex than
the structure of those particles’ physical properties”. Hence, at
the most foundational level, what exists there can be considered
a micro-subject. Similar to the fusion account, the micro-unity
hypothesis (MUH) supposes, “…when two subjects are related
in the relevant way, their experiences become unified…”. Thus,
consciousness becomes more complex as a function of specific
combination relations.
To conclude, as quantum science advances and our
understanding of what it means for something to be
fundamental changes, so too does our conception of what
consciousness would look like at that level. For example,
emerging theories such as field panpsychism (Horne 2020) aim
to account for new developments.
4.3 The Axiology of Panpsychism
The intrinsic value of consciousness and panpsychism, I
have argued, entails the value of all beings—from the most
fundamental entity whether that be micro entities such as
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quarks or fields to macroscopic combinations of those entities
such as brains or planets. In this picture, value is pervasive
insofar as everything has consciousness as its intrinsic nature,
even if that consciousness is not complex, and consciousness
has intrinsic value. Given the arguments I have previously
forwarded, taken together, they provide an axiology of
panpsychism. That is, consciousness is intrinsically valuable
in that it has the requisite moral, epistemic, and aesthetic
axiological features. Consciousness is morally intrinsically
valuable because phenomenal consciousness is the ground
of dignity and dignity is intrinsically morally valuable.
Consciousness is epistemically intrinsically valuable because
it can be a truth-maker for a proposition P. Consciousness is
aesthetically intrinsically valuable because it can reflexively
appreciate the beauty of its own existence as well as the
experience of pleasure. Thus, consciousness possesses all the
requisite axiological components.
5 Implications and Future Directions
The axiology of panpsychism appears to lead to significant
ethical implications regarding our interaction with other
entities. In this section, I will only be scratching the surface
of these implications since the central aim of this paper was
to outline how panpsychism leads to the pervasive value of
all entities without merely taking it for granted. That being
said, some implications include consequences for Great Chain
of Being intuitions, ethical consumption, and potentially
existentialism.
With respect to GCOB intuitions, if we accept combinationism
or the fusion view of panpsychism, then we can accept that
there are gradients to conscious experience because complex
consciousness is a result of specific relations between micro
conscious parts. If those relations do not obtain, then the
conscious parts remain rudimentary. Therefore, we can continue
to suppose that rocks are not conscious in the way that animals
are conscious, and so forth.
So, Roelofs (2019) states that, “insofar as panpsychism conflicts
with the GCOB intuition, it seems to undermine one major
rationale for ethical vegetarianism or veganism” which seems
altogether an extreme implication. Nevertheless, Roelofs argues
that panpsychists may grant moral status to all beings, in the
way that I have. He states,
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“the moral reasons [against interference] are usually
outweighed by those provided by the hedonic, conative,
and epistemic experiences of animals. That is, they
might say that it is morally better not to kill a plant than
to kill one, but that animals need to sustain their richer
sort of life justifies killing plants for food.” (Roelofs,
2019)
The sentiment that Roelof forwards here is consistent with my
line of argumentation. The axiology of panpsychism does not
need to conflict with ethical veganism/vegetarianism because
what makes something conscious in increasingly morally
important ways is the way in which the fundamental conscious
subjects combine and the justification for interference by beings
with complex consciousness.
While the previous suggestions seem to not offer any
prescriptions for how we ought to engage with the world—I
think there are important implications for our relationships
with other entities. In accordance with Mathews (2003), “if not
only human beings but other self-realizing systems, or selves,
including the world-as-a-whole, are understood as subjects
rather than as pure objects, then perhaps encounter should
be seen as the appropriate mode for relating with the world
at large”. Thus, from an existential perspective, cultivating
an attitude of accepting and appreciating reality as it is will
engender respect and sympathy toward it. Moreover, in
traversing our surroundings through encountering, it is not
to simply project human qualities into everything (Mathews,
2003), but we ought to see entities as they are and respond to
each appropriately as a unique locus of experience.
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Introduction
This paper explores Quine’s solution to the problem of negative
existentials. First, Russell’s theory of descriptions shall be
explained as an original solution to this problem. Next, it will
be explained how Quine utilizes Russell’s theory and expands
it to apply to all singular terms within a language. Finally, it
shall be demonstrated that Quine’s solution is not a descriptive
solution, but a normative solution. As such, to argue against
the plausibility of his solution involves disputing his normative
methodological considerations. The paper shall conclude by
explaining the pros and cons of a modified Quinean solution
against the solution he objects to in “On What There Is”.
The Problem of Negative Existentials
To understand the problem of negative existentials, one must
understand the principles that govern the theories of meaning
employed by philosophers like Frege, Russell, and Quine.
The problem arises due to an inherent tension among these
principles. The first principle is that of compositionality:
[ComP] If two expressions have the same reference, then
substitution of one for the other in a third expression
does not change its reference1.

In [ComP], ‘expressions’ refers to both individual
syntactic units like words, as well as complete
expressions like sentences. Thus, the substitution of
a word x in a sentence S with an equivalent reference
results in no change to the meaning of neither the word
nor the sentence. This relies on a further assumption
surrounding the foundation of meaning:
[ToM] Meaning consists wholly in the reference of
expressions.

If [ToM] is true, then one can derive two further principles:
1 Zoltán Gendler Szabó, Problems of Compositionality (Routledge, 2013), 7.
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[ToM-W] The meaning of a word consists in its
ontological correlate.

[ToM-S] The meaning of a sentence consists in its truthvalue2.

From these principles one can derive an absurd conclusion.
Consider a sentence of the following form: ‘There does not exist
an object x.’ If, as [ComP] states, the meaning of a sentence is
determined by the references of its constituent parts, then the
referent of ‘x’ will provide meaning to the sentence in which
it is contained, thus providing the truth-value to the sentence.
If no constituents in the sentence have a reference, then the
sentence cannot have meaning and (by [ToM-S]) cannot have a
truth-value. This is prima facie incorrect: a rational agent would
not believe that a sentence of this form has no truth-value, let
alone has no meaning.
The problem then becomes how one avoids this undesirable
absurdity while retaining the principles one deems as
intuitively correct for all other cases.
Russell’s Solution: The Theory of Descriptions
Russell draws attention to a distinction between grammatical
form and logical form. He argues that although it may be the
case that a certain expression in a sentence serves as the subject
(or singular term) grammatically, it need not be the case that it
serves as the subject (or singular term) logically. Russell gives
an example of the sentence, ‘All men [humans] are mortal’.
Grammatically, ‘all men’ serves as the subject of this sentence;
however, to determine the truth-value of this sentence, one
must derive its logical form. Thus, he argues the correct logical
form is: ‘If x is human, then x is mortal’3. Therefore, the subject
is no longer ‘all men’, but is instead the variable x whose
domain ranges over all possible objects in the world.
Drawing attention to the distinction between grammatical and
logical form, Russell argues that one can dissolve the problem
of negative existentials. In such sentences, though an expression
may serve grammatically as subject, it does not do so in its
logical form. The sentence, ‘There does not exist an object x’, has
2 Te justifcation of this assumption is outside the scope of this paper; however, for justifcations,
see: Gottlob Frege, “On Concept and Object,” in B. McGuinness ed., Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 193.
3 Bertrand Russell, “On Denoting,” Mind 14, no. 56 (1905): 480.
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a logical form that does not treat the object under consideration
as the singular term. Suppose the object under consideration is
‘Pegasus’. The logical form of the sentence, ‘There does not exist
a Pegasus’, would have the following logical form4, 5:
~(3x)[(Pegasus(x) A ('vy)(Pegasus(y)

⇒

x

= y)]'

Thus, as in the universal quantifier example above, the subject
of this sentence is the variable x that ranges over all objects
in the domain under consideration (the external world for
Russell).
Understanding negative existentials as having this logical form
entails that the truth of such a sentence is no longer dependent
on the reference of some singular-term ‘Pegasus’, but rather,
upon the existence of some object x that is contained under
the concept of ‘Pegasus’. Therefore, one can hold the stated
principles without deriving the problem of negative existentials.
Quine’s Adoption
The analysis posed in the introduction of “How does Quine
solve the problem of negative existentials” is, strictly speaking,
a nonsensical question. Unlike Russell, Quine seems to reject
[ComP]: “[…] truth values seem to attach to singular statement
only conditionally upon existence of the named object…
there would seem, under ordinary usage, to be no way of
adjudicating the truth values of ‘Pegasus flies’ and ‘~Pegasus
flies’; the nonexistence of Pegasus seems to dispose of the
question without answering it.”6 This position is the same
as Gottlob Frege’s7. Despite (as shall be shown) adopting
the Theory of Descriptions and, in a sense, providing a
‘solution’ to the problem of negative existentials, this is simply
an unintended by-product of a larger intent: to advance a
normative program of eliminating singular terms from one’s
language8. This normative component will be crucial in the
4 Sentences of this form are called ‘defnitive descriptions’.
5 It should be noted that, strictly speaking, the usage of ‘exist’ as a predicate is not possible for
Russell’s system of philosophy. He proposes the principle of acquaintance to avoid the issues that
come with admitting a concept like ‘existence’. For simplicity’s sake, and because it has no impact
on the thesis of this paper, I ignore this issue.
6 Lenny Clapp, Marga Reimer, and Anne Spire, “Negative Existentials,” in Jeanette Gundel and
Barbara Abbott ed. Te Oxford Handbook of Reference (Oxford University Press, 2019): 13; W.
V. Quine, “Meaning and Inference” in From a Logical Point of View: Logico-Philosophical Essays
(Harper & Row, 1963), 165.
7 Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (Harper & Row, 1973), 185.
8 Te normative component of Quine, especially his naturalized is epistemology, is acknowledged
by himself: W. V. Quine, Pursuit of Truth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 1920; Lenny Clapp, Marga Reimer, and Anne Spire, “Negative Existentials,” in Jeanette Gundel and
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objection posed to Quine’s ‘solution’ at the end of this paper.
Having acknowledged the nature of Quine’s motivations, one
can now see that his solution is indirect at best, but that it can
be loosely considered a solution with qualifications. A brief
historical exposition will serve to provide a clearer picture of
Quine’s motivations in the elimination of singular terms.
Quine Against Meinong or Wyman
In “On What There Is,” Quine engages with an imagined
interlocutor by the name of “Wyman.” This interlocutor is
meant to represent the thoughts of Meinong, who famously
drew a distinction between existing and real objects. Meinong
held that, though something may not be ‘real’, it can still
be present within one’s conceptual scheme by ‘existing’9.
Thus, though no real object is a ‘gold mountain’, an object
falling under the concepts ‘goldenness’ and ‘mountainhood’
still ‘exists’. According to Meinong, to reject this is to be
“prejudice[d] in favor of the actual.10” Meinong’s motivation
in proposing his “jungle” is to provide an ontology that meets
the natural intuition that every thought has a corresponding
object associated with it11. This also provides a solution to the
problem of negative existentials: the ‘unreal objects’ may not be
‘real’, but they are still able to be referents of sentences in virtue
of their existence in one’s ontology.
Quine proposes multiple arguments against this perspective;
however, most are ultimately unsuccessful because they beg
the question against Meinong. For example, Quine argues that
Meinong’s jungle entails that there must exist contradictory
objects. If every conceivable combination of properties has a
corresponding entity (existing or not), then there are naturally
logically-contradictory objects: “Can we drive Wyman now to
Barbara Abbott ed. Te Oxford Handbook of Reference (Oxford University Press, 2019): 13-4.
9 Tere are, of course, multiple ways to formulate this view. Tis formulation difers from Quine’s
in “On What Matters”; however, I believe this formulation is simpler for the paper and it in no
way changes Quine’s motivations or arguments against the Meinongian view.
10 Terence Parsons, Nonexistent Objects (Yale University Press, 1980), 18; A. Meinong, “Te
Teory of Objects,” in R. Chisholm ed. Realism and the Background of Phenomenology (New
York: Free Press, 1960).
11 Tough outside the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that this follows from Meinong’s
adoption of Brentano and Husserl’s notion of intentionality: the thoughts in a rational agent’s
mind have a certain relationship with the external world wherein all thoughts are targeted towards an object. To make sense of this intentionality, there must be some object thought about.
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admitting a realm of unactualized possibilities?12” This might
strike Quine as absurd prima facie; however, Meinong has no
qualms with such a result:
Naturally I cannot in any way evade this consequence:
whoever once has dealings with a round square will
not be able to stop when faced with a square or some
other sort of object which is simultaneously round and
not round. But one will also, as far as I can see, have
weighty reasons hereupon to take the initiative: the
principle of contradiction is to be applied by no one to
anything other than to reality and possibility13, 14.

Thus, Quine’s objections to Meinong cannot be posed without
begging the question against Meinong; the conclusions deemed
absurd by Quine are not deemed absurd by Meinong and
followers, and Quine gives no reason why such a position is
absurd.
Similarly, Quine argues that Wyman’s usage of ‘exist’ is unfair:
it merely pushes the problem of negative existentials back a
step. Yet, having clearly recognized the distinction between
‘exist’ and ‘real’, one can recognize that this does actually solve
the problem as properly constructed. Meinong’s proposal
would only be inadequate if he argued that existing, unreal
entities were not capable of functioning as referents to singular
terms as stipulated by [ComP]. Yet, as stated, this is not an
absurdity for Meinong: the entire motivation of such a broad,
rich ontology is to provide such unreal entities the ability to
function as the ontological correlates of such singular terms.
As such, these objections against Wyman (Meinong) are ruled
question-begging. The primary question then becomes: why
prefer Quine’s solution to Meinong’s?
Quine’s Solution
Quine adopts Russell’s Theory of Descriptions and broadens
its scope. Rather than treating only non-referring singular
terms as functioning as definite descriptions, he argues that all
singular terms within a language function this way. His reasons
12 W. V. Quine, “On What Tere Is” in From a Logical Point of View: Logico-Philosophical
Essays (Harper & Row, 1963), 4.
13 Terence Parsons, Nonexistent Objects (Yale University Press, 1980), 31.
14 I take for granted this reading is correct. Tere do exist other interpretations of Meinong that
do not entail this conclusion. See: ibid.
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for doing so rest on methodological principles like economy
and Ockham’s razor. He wishes to reduce the cardinality of
the set of all existing objects in one’s ontology15. By treating all
singular terms as definitive descriptions, one no longer needs
to hold that all such terms have a unique ontological correlation
that exists in the world. This would greatly reduce the number
of entities contained within an ontological framework.
Quine’s Solution vs. Meinong’s Solution
Having established that Quine’s objections are inadequate
against Meinong’s presuppositions, one must inquire as to the
undesirability of these presuppositions. At the heart of Quine’s
philosophy is a vehement adherence to Ockham’s razor: to
minimize both the number of kinds of entities, as well as the
number of individual entities within a given kind16. Assuming
Ockham’s razor is a desirable methodological principle, one
can press Meinong on the fact that it violates this principle. Yet,
one must also recognize some glaring flaws with Quine’s own
solution.
First, Quine’s solution does not seem to provide a clear method
of revealing the logical form of sentences that contain indexicals
(‘I’, ‘this’, ‘my’, ‘there’, etc.). Thus, how does one reveal the
logical form of ‘This cup is red’? Quine’s speculative solution
is radically inadequate: it rests on translating ‘this’ into ‘there’,
which is still an indexical preposition17. It is outside the scope
of this paper to consider if there is some other way to correct
this deficiency, but it is certain that Quine never provided any
solution of his own.
Secondly, it is unclear how one is to translate a singular term
into a definite description. For example, take the proper
name ‘Aristotle’. What definite description would correspond
to this proper name? One possible answer would be ‘The
student of Plato’. However, this is still quite ambiguous:
there have been multiple students of Plato. Perhaps instead
one gives the description ‘Writer of Nichomachean Ethics’.
If meaning is inherently tied to understanding the references
of expressions, as Quine thinks it is, can someone mean the
15 W. V. Quine, “On Simple Teories of a Complex World,” in Te Ways of Paradox and Other
Essays (Random House, 1966), 242.
16 Ibid.
17 W. V. Quine, Word and Object (Te M.I.T. Press, 1960), 163; Lenny Clapp, Marga Reimer,
and Anne Spire, “Negative Existentials,” in Jeanette Gundel and Barbara Abbott ed. Te Oxford
Handbook of Reference (Oxford University Press, 2019): 12-3.
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referent of ‘Aristotle’ even if they are not aware of one of the
unique definite descriptions of him and instead know only the
ambiguous description ‘The student of Plato’18?
The strongest objection to Quine, as noted by Clapp, Reimer,
and Spire, is that the interpretation of singular terms all being
definite descriptions is explanatorily inadequate19. When one
asserts ‘The sun is hot’, it is unintuitive to suggest that one is
actually asserting ‘There exists an arbitrary object such that it
is a sun, and any other arbitrary object that is a sun is the first
arbitrary object, and it is hot’. Russell’s solution seems to work
in part because it is explanatorily adequate: it is not unintuitive
to suggest unreal entities are spoken of in this manner. To
extend this translation to all singular objects seems absurd.
Yet, crucially, Quine would agree; descriptively, his theory is
bunk. However, this is of no concern because Quine’s project
here is prescriptive and normative and not descriptive:
Quine is not interested in why we judge some occurrences of
negative existentials to be true; rather, Quine is proposing a
revision of natural language which will enable us to discuss the
ontological question of what there is without having to face the
problem of negative existentials20.
This is why it was stated that Quine’s solution is not really a
solution at all in the original sense of the question. It is not a
descriptive solution; however, it is a solution that could work
if a group of language users adopted it as a true reflection of
human thought while providing utterances containing singular
terms.
With this crucial qualification in mind, I suggest we create a
new position that encompasses Russell’s solution in the form of
the Theory of Descriptions, with the normative principles Quine
utilizes (question-beggingly) in his objections to Meinong. Thus,
we abandon Quine’s conception of eliminating singular terms
altogether and restrict ourselves to merely unreal objects; yet,
we make as our primary motivation Ockham’s razor as Quine
does (and arguably as Russell does too). We shall call this
18 Problems like these have motivated many philosophers to abandon a descriptive theory
of proper names and to adopt Kripke’s causal theory. It is of course possible to provide many
amendments to answer the objection posed; however, the thrust is clear. Any response requires
weakening Quine’s original thesis.
19 Ibid., 13.
20 Ibid., 14.
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worldview Quine₂.
It should be noted that there can be no resolution in this paper;
a methodological dispute takes far greater than eight pages, and
there can be no clear decider between Meinong’s and Quine₂’s
solutions. In conclusion, all that can be provided is a summary
of what each view entails. It is up to the individual philosopher
to determine which normative considerations are considered
more valuable.
Meinong’s solution works: no contradictions arise on the
presuppositions that are adopted. Such presuppositions,
however, may be seen as undesirable by other philosophers.
These include: an extremely expanded, though powerful,
ontology; a commitment to the existence of logically
contradictory entities; and, arguably, a departure from commonsense thought on the usage of ‘existence’.
Quine₂’s solution arguably does not work: there are multiple
objections that must be resolved before one can definitely say
that it does. These include the problems of indexicals (as used
in negative existentials), and the problem of ambiguity (as
applied to negative existentials), among others not covered in
this paper. Its largest benefit is an extremely economical and
reduced ontology.

61

Bibliography
Clapp, Lenny, Marga Reimer, and Anne Spire. “Negative
Existentials,” in Jeanette Gundel and Barbara Abbott ed., The
Oxford Handbook of Reference. Oxford University Press, 2019.
Dummett, Michael. Frege: Philosophy of Language. Harper &
Row, 1973.
Frege, Gottlob. “On Concept and Object,” in B. McGuinness
ed., Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984.
Meinong, A. “The Theory of Objects,” in R. Chisholm ed.,
Realism and the Background of Phenomenology. New York:
Free Press, 1960.
Parsons, Terence. Nonexistent Objects. Yale University Press,
1980.
Quine, W. V. “Meaning and Inference,” in From a Logical Point
of View: Logico-Philosophical Essays. Harper & Row, 1963.
Quine, W. V. “On Simple Theories of a Complex World,” in The
Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. Random House, 1966.
Quine, W. V. “On What There Is,” in From a Logical Point of
View: Logico-Philosophical Essays. Harper & Row, 1963.
Quine, W. V. Pursuit of Truth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1990.
Quine, W. V. Word and Object. The M.I.T. Press, 1960.
Russell, Bertrand. “On Denoting.” Mind 14, no. 56 (1905): 47993.
Szabó, Zoltán Gendler. Problems of Compositionality.
Routledge, 2013.

EPISTEME
Denison University’s Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy
announces the scheduled publication of Volume XXXIV, May 2023

CALL FOR PAPERS

Episteme is a student-run journal that aims to recognize and encourage
excellence in undergraduate philosophy by providing examples of
some of the best work currently being done in undergraduate
philosophy programs. Episteme is published under the auspices of
Denison University’s Department of Philosophy.
Beginning in 2011, the journal is being published at
https://journals.denison.edu/episteme/ too, using a Creative
Commons license.
Episteme will consider papers written by undergraduate students
in any area of phi- losophy. Papers are evaluated according to the
following criteria: quality of research, depth of philosophic inquiry,
creativity, original insight and clarity. Submissions to be considered
for the thirty-fourth volume (May 2023) should adhere to the following stipulations:
1. Be a maximum of 5,000 words, a minimum of 2,000 words.
2. Combine research and original insight.
3. Include a cover sheet that provides the following information: author’s name, mailing address (current and permanent), email address,
telephone number, college or university name, title of submission and
word count.
4. Include a works cited page in the Chicago Manual of Style format.
Please use endnotes rather than footnotes.
5. To allow for a blind review process, the author’s name should not
appear on the submission itself.
6. Submissions should be sent electronically, formatted for Microsoft
Word.
7. More than one article per author will not be accepted for review.
8. Please be courteous; submit each paper to only one journal.
Rolling submissions accepted. Submissions to be considered for May 2023
publication must be received by midnight, Tuesday, December 20, 2022.
Please send papers and cover sheets to episteme@denison.edu.
Questions should be submitted to the Editors (episteme@denison.edu)

